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DIVINE SATISFICING AND THE ETHICS OF  
THE PROBLEM OF EVIL
Chris Tucker
This paper accomplishes three goals. First, it reveals that God’s ethics has a 
radical satisficing structure: God can choose a good enough suboptimal option 
even if there is a best option and no countervailing considerations. Second, it 
resolves the long-standing worry that there is no account of the good enough 
that is both principled and demanding enough to be good enough. Third, it 
vindicates the key ethical assumption in the problem of evil without relying 
on the contested assumption that God’s ethics is our ethics (on steroids).
1. Introduction
No one expects God’s ethics to have a satisficing structure, a structure 
which makes it rational, in the absence of countervailing considerations, 
to reject the better for the good enough. Satisficing, in this narrow sense, 
is rarely thought to apply to human ethics.1 It is especially controversial 
whether it applies to divine ethics. For an absolutely perfect God might 
be expected to go above and beyond the call of duty, to always choose the 
best in the absence of countervailing considerations.2 I reject these sensible 
expectations. I argue that God’s ethics has a satisficing structure.
Indeed, I argue that God’s ethics has a particular satisficing structure: in 
the absence of countervailing considerations, God must make each crea-
ture’s life fully good but not necessarily maximally good. A creature’s life is 
fully good when, roughly, it has all the goodness that it ought to have. The 
notion of full goodness is crucial. It underwrites the positive arguments 
that I offer on behalf of satisficing. It also resolves a longstanding worry 
about satisficing structures. For no other account of the good enough is both 
principled and demanding enough to be good enough.
This paper has direct relevance to the argument from evil. Standard 
formulations of the argument appeal to something like this conjunction:
1See §3 for a discussion of how this conception of satisficing relates to the broader 
literature.
2See, e.g., Kraay, “Can God Satisfice?” 404–405.
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Ethical Premise:  God necessarily prevents suffering in the absence of 
sufficiently strong countervailing considerations, and
Empirical Premise:  There exists some suffering for which God would 
not have a sufficiently strong countervailing 
consideration.
Together these premises entail that something exists—suffering in the 
absence of sufficiently strong countervailing considerations—which nec-
essarily doesn’t exist if God exists. So God doesn’t exist. Recent literature 
on the argument from evil, including the literature on skeptical theism, 
tends to focus on whether the empirical premise is true or reasonable. To 
the extent that the ethical premise has been defended at all, it is defended 
by the following sort of analogical reasoning: excellent human beings pre-
vent suffering in the absence of countervailing considerations, so (an abso-
lutely perfect) God does too. Murphy forcefully challenges this analogical 
reasoning and concludes that we should reject Ethical Premise, thereby 
refuting the standard arguments from evil.3
I grant Murphy’s challenge to the analogical reasoning for the sake of 
argument. I vindicate Ethical Premise without assuming that God’s ethics 
is our ethics or our ethics on steroids. Maximal well-being is not required 
for full goodness, so God does not need a countervailing consideration to 
forgo elevating us to the greatest heights of well-being. Yet full goodness 
does require the absence of suffering, so God does need a countervailing 
consideration to allow us to descend into the depths of despair. This satis-
ficing picture is not what we expected God’s ethics to look like. It nonethe-
less vindicates the ethical premise in the argument from evil.
In the next section, §2, I distinguish between requiring and merely jus-
tifying reasons and explain why the former have a special role to play in 
the explanation of divine (in)action. I employ the requiring/merely justi-
fying distinction in §3, where I clarify what it is for God’s reasons to have 
a satisficing structure and distinguish that structure from its alternatives.
My arguments for divine satisficing initially assume a certain medieval 
neo-Platonist axiology. The concept full goodness is most familiar in that 
context (though not by that name). In addition, Murphy assumes this axi-
ology. I give Murphy the axiology he wants and show that what follows 
is a satisficing structure capable of grounding the ethical premise in the 
argument from evil. In §4, I identify, clarify, and briefly defend the provi-
sionally assumed neo-Platonism, as well as the notion of full goodness. In 
§§5–6, I argue that God’s reasons have a satisficing structure. In a nutshell, 
satisficing best captures—in two ways—the normative import of the dif-
ference between full goodness and deprivation, given that these concepts 
are understood in the relevant neo-Platonic way.
After demonstrating that Murphy’s neo-Platonism supports divine 
satisficing, I  show that my arguments for divine satisficing can survive 
3See Murphy, God’s Own Ethics, especially chs. 3 and 6, and “Is an Absolutely Perfect 
Being Morally Perfect?”
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without the assumption of neo-Platonism. In §7, I explain why the essen-
tial features of my arguments for divine satisficing depend only on 
neo-Platonism’s commitment to the full goodness threshold; I show that 
this threshold fits comfortably in other metaethical frameworks; and I pro-
vide independent grounds for endorsing the full goodness threshold. In 
§8, I explain how full goodness resolves the longstanding worry that satis-
ficing theories have no account of the good enough that is both principled 
and demanding enough to be good enough.
In §9, I apply full goodness satisficing to the problem of evil and defend 
its application against two concerns in the recent literature. The upshot is 
that it vindicates the key ethical assumption in the problem of evil.
2. Two Kinds of Reasons
Reasons (for action) are things that contribute in a systematic way to a 
given normative status, usually (ir)rationality. Rationality is “finally 
authoritative in settling questions of what to do.”4 With respect to God, a 
rational action is one that is worthy of being chosen by an absolutely per-
fect being. An irrational action is one that is not worthy of being chosen by 
such a being.5 On this conception of rationality, there is no gap between an 
action’s being (divinely) rational and an action’s being good enough for 
God. If it is rational for God to satisfice, it is possible that God satisfices. 
Thus, one worry about divine satisficing—that it might be rational with-
out being good enough for God—is stymied right from the get-go.
Divine reasons, then, are things that make systematic contributions to 
an action’s being (not) worthy of divine choice. There are two different 
kinds of systematic contributions that reasons can make, which track two 
different kinds of force they can have. It is standardly assumed that all rea-
sons have justifying force, roughly, the capacity to make an act rational.6 It 
is less clear whether all reasons have requiring force, roughly, the capacity 
to make doing anything else irrational.7
4Darwall, Impartial Reason, 215–16.
5The labels “rationality” and “(ir)rational” do not matter. Just replace “rationality” with 
your favorite term for the single, comprehensive normative perspective that is finally author-
itative concerning questions of what God is to do. And replace “(ir)rational” with your 
favorite term for what’s (not) worthy of divine choice from the relevant perspective.
6Horgan and Timmons (“Untying a Knot from the Inside Out,” 55) are the only excep-
tion to this standard assumption that I’m aware of. In order to account for what they call 
“meritorious supererogation,” they correctly hold that they must posit a third dimension of 
normative force, merit-making. They incorrectly infer that merit-making force is possible in 
the absence of justifying force. How can a reason have the capacity to confer merit on an act 
without having the capacity to make the act rational? Hint: it can’t.
7If something has requiring force without justifying force, I call it a coherence constraint. 
I assume that nothing provides a coherence constraint for God. When theorists claim that 
human beings are subject to coherence constraints, it is due to some imperfection. For exam-
ple, an irrational desire to eat every rock you can find has some tendency to make it irrational 
to not eat the next rock without having any tendency to make it rational to eat the rock.
35DIVINE SATISFICING AND THE ETHICS OF THE PROBLEM OF EVIL
If a reason to φ has requiring force, it is a requiring reason, i.e., a reason 
that both makes φ pro tanto rational and makes doing anything else pro 
tanto irrational.8 Requiring reasons to φ don’t necessarily make φ required; 
rather, they necessarily make it required in the absence of countervailing con-
siderations. If a reason to φ doesn’t have requiring force, it is a merely jus-
tifying reason, i.e., a reason that pro tanto makes it rational to φ but does 
not make it pro tanto irrational to do something else instead.9 Merely jus-
tifying reasons don’t necessarily make it rational to φ; rather, they neces-
sarily make it rational to φ in the absence of countervailing considerations. So 
understood, all reasons are either requiring (have justifying and requiring 
force) or merely justifying (have justifying but not requiring force).
For simplicity, I follow Murphy in assuming that what God can (can’t) 
do must be grounded in what God has reason to (not) do.10 Since all rea-
sons are either requiring or merely justifying, it follows that what God 
can (can’t) do must be fully accounted for by these two kinds of reasons. 
Merely justifying reasons have some tendency to give God discretion in 
one respect without limiting it in any respect. If God’s reason to give you 
an ice cream cone is merely justifying, then, in the absence of countervail-
ing considerations, God can give you an ice cream cone and God can do 
something else instead.
Requiring reasons have some tendency to give God discretion in one 
respect and some tendency to eliminate it in every other respect. If God’s 
reason to prevent your suffering is requiring, then in the absence of coun-
tervailing considerations, God can prevent your suffering and God cannot 
fail to do so. Consequently, requiring reasons have a special role to play in 
determining the scope of what God can do. In the absence of countervail-
ing considerations, both merely justifying and requiring reasons to φ can 
explain why God can φ. Yet only requiring reasons can explain why God 
can’t choose an action. If God can’t let you suffer, it is because both (a) God 
has requiring reason to not let you suffer, and (b) God has no sufficiently 
strong countervailing considerations. To put the same point in more pos-
itive terms: if God must choose an action (if God can’t choose any alter-
native), then God must have undefeated requiring reason to perform that 
action. Since Ethical Premise is a premise about what God can’t do (God 
can’t allow suffering in the absence of countervailing considerations), it 
assumes that God always has a requiring reason to prevent suffering.
8Pro tanto rational = rational in the absence of countervailing considerations. Pro tanto 
irrational = irrational in the absence of countervailing considerations.
9For further clarification of requiring and justifying strength, see Gert, “The Distinction 
between Justifying and Requiring,” and Tucker, “How to Think about Satisficing,” 1373–1376.
10Murphy, God’s Own Ethics, ch 2. As it stands, this simplifying assumption is too sim-
ple to be true but is close enough for the present purposes. The main complications won’t 
concern us here (e.g., God’s inability to make 2 + 2 = 5 isn’t grounded in what reasons God 
has, but something prior: what options God has). See Murphy’s (God’s Own Ethics, ch 2, sec 
2.2) and Swinburne’s (The Coherence of Theism, 148–152) discussion of perfect rationality and 
freedom for why the simplifying assumption is plausibly on the right track.
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3. The Structure of Divine Reasons: Rivals and Methodology
3.1. Three Rival Structures
This paper is concerned with the sort of reasons that an individual crea-
ture’s well-being gives God to promote that well-being. Thus, we should 
set aside any reasons that God has from other sources, such as his prom-
ises or the fairness of a given distribution of well-being across people. We 
are focused solely on the sort of reasons an individual’s well-being pro-
vides God to promote that well-being.
Everyone seems to agree—at least I assume—that creaturely well-being 
provides God with reasons to make a creature’s life better.11 The debate is 
about what structure those reasons have. One potential structure is:
No Requiring Reasons (NRR): the well-being of creatures provides 
only merely justifying reasons to give a creature higher degrees of 
well-being.
No Requiring Reasons holds that no matter how bad a creature’s life is, 
God has no requiring reason to make the life better. If true, NRR would 
refute the ethical premise in the argument from evil, which holds that God 
can permit suffering only if God has a countervailing consideration. NRR 
says that, even in the absence of countervailing considerations, God can 
rationally ignore suffering no matter how bad it is.
The second structure holds that the well-being of creatures has some 
tendency to limit what God can do, but only up to a certain point.
Satisficing Reasons (SR): God has requiring reason to promote a crea-
ture’s well-being to at least some suboptimal degree GE;12 God’s reason 
to promote a creature’s well-being beyond GE are merely justifying.
GE is whatever degree counts as “the good enough.” Below GE is not 
good enough and above GE is more than enough. Satisficing Reasons 
limits what God can do below GE, because God needs a countervailing 
consideration to allow a creature to have less well-being than GE. SR does 
not limit what God can do above GE, because God does not need a coun-
tervailing consideration to allow the creature to enjoy less than a maximal 
degree of well-being. The version of SR that I  defend takes a stand on 
what GE is, namely GE = being fully good (both for the whole life and 
every part of it13). We can call the resulting version of SR, SR*. God has 
11To deny this assumption is to deny that considerations such as it would be better for the 
creature provide any reason or rationale at all for God to prefer one situation over another. 
Such a denial seems implausible (though, it would be controversial to say that all God’s rea-
sons have that form). It’s also worth mentioning that Ethical Premise in the argument from 
evil takes for granted that God always has a (requiring) reason, at the very least, to make a 
suffering creature better off.
12For our purposes, we can say that a degree of well-being is suboptimal for creatures of 
kind K iff creatures of that kind can generally have some higher degree of well-being.
13It may seem overkill to hold that the good enough is full goodness for the whole life and 
every part of it. Recall, though, that I’m trying to vindicate Ethical Premise. A life might be 
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requiring reason to ensure that (parts of) lives are at least fully good—
which is enough to get the argument from evil up and running—but only 
merely justifying reasons to ensure that (parts of) lives are even better. 
We’ll clarify full goodness in the next section.
The third structure is:
Just Requiring Reasons (JRR): for every higher degree of well-being 
that God could bring about, God has requiring reason to bring about 
that higher degree.
JRR is compatible with God’s giving a creature a suboptimal degree of 
well-being, i.e., less well-being than God could have given that creature. 
If God can make a creature’s life better than W, God still might give the 
creature W if God has a countervailing consideration, e.g., if someone’s 
freedom would have to be violated to give the creature more than W. The 
“JRR Conjunction” is JRR plus the view that sometimes there are coun-
tervailing considerations strong enough to justify giving a creature some 
suboptimal degree of well-being.14
No Requiring Reasons, Satisficing Reasons, and Just Requiring Reasons 
are pairwise incompatible. NRR holds that God has no requiring reasons 
to promote creaturely well-being at all. SR claims that God has requir-
ing reason to promote creaturely well-being up to a certain (suboptimal) 
point, the good enough, and only merely justifying reason beyond that 
point. JRR holds that God has requiring reason to make a creature’s life 
better as long as God can make the creature’s life better.
Let me briefly indicate how JRR, SR(*), and NRR are related to the broader 
debate about satisficing. These theses are focused solely on God’s reasons 
to promote a certain good, namely a creature’s well-being. Analogs of these 
theses could be constructed for any good. For example, consider the value 
of the world and the reasons it provides God to promote that value. The 
value of the world might never provide a requiring reason for God to make 
the world better (NRRW), it might provide a requiring reason only up to a 
certain point (SRW), or it might provide a requiring reason as long as God 
can make the world better (JRRW). In principle, a satisficing structure might 
apply to God’s reasons to promote creaturely well-being without applying 
to God’s reason to promote the overall value of the world.
When philosophers argue that some satisficing theory is true, they usu-
ally aim to defend little more than this claim: for some good, some agent can 
rationally reject the better for the less good. This claim is compatible with 
good on the whole even though it contains some instance of suffering. If God has requiring 
reason to prevent every instance of suffering, as Ethical Premise supposes, then God must 
have requiring reason to make every part of the life fully good. This demanding account of 
the good enough is also what follows from the arguments I give later in the paper.
14The “Just Requiring Reasons” part of the JRR Conjunction applies only to the sort of rea-
sons creaturely well-being provides God to promote that well-being. The JRR Conjunction 
is compatible with merely justifying reasons (e.g. a prerogative) serving as a countervailing 
consideration that makes it rational for God to choose a suboptimal degree of well-being.
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all three rival structures. I am using “satisficing theories” more narrowly to 
apply to the structure involved in SR and SRW.
15 Those who defend some-
thing under the label of “satisficing theory” almost always have something 
like the JRR Conjunction structure in mind.16 They think, for example, that 
God has requiring reason to make the world better as long as God can make 
it better; however, they add that God has some countervailing consideration 
that makes it all-in rational to reject better worlds for less good worlds.17
Let’s return to our focus on God’s reasons to promote creaturely well-be-
ing. Murphy clearly endorses NRR, and many others apparently do so as 
well.18 The JRR Conjunction is the standard way to account for how God 
can rationally reject the better for the less good. Until now, it’s not clear 
that anyone has been foolish enough to defend SR, much less SR*. And 
this paper may reveal, ironically, that it is divine ethics, not human ethics, 
that is more apt to have a satisficing structure.
3.2. Methodological Considerations
You might have noticed that Murphy’s view seems prima facie absurd. 
Consider two similar worlds, W1 and W2. The main difference is that W1 
involves neither Jim’s enjoying a certain jelly bean at a certain time nor any 
holocausts, whereas W2 involves both Jim’s enjoying that jelly bean and a 
holocaust. You would think that God would need a pretty powerful coun-
tervailing consideration to prefer W2 over W1; however, Murphy’s NRR 
denies this. NRR claims that the badness of the holocausts provides only 
merely justifying reasons, and so God can rationally ignore them in the 
absence of countervailing considerations.19
15See Tucker (“How to Think about Satisficing,” 1375-81) for a detailed clarification of 
this structure and how it is different from the JRR Conjunction structure, or what I there call 
“motivated submaximization theory.”
16See Tucker, “Satisficing and Motivated Submaximization” for a defense of these claims 
regarding divine ethics, and Tucker, “How to Think about Satisficing” for a defense of these 
claims regarding human ethics.
17E.g., Langtry, God, the Best, and Evil, 74–78.
18See Murphy, “Is an Absolutely Perfect Being Morally Perfect?” and God’s Own Ethics, 
ch. 4. A number of other philosophers would find NRR very attractive, if they were to agree 
that the simplifying assumption from §2 is on the right track. Historically, these philosophers 
include Aquinas (see Davies, The Reality of God and the Problem of Evil, especially ch. 4 and 
the appendix; cf. God’s Own Ethics, ch 4, sec 4.4) and Duns Scotus (M. Adams, “Duns Scotus 
on the Goodness of God”). In the contemporary scene, this includes Marilyn Adams (“Duns 
Scotus on the Goodness of God,” 500; Horrendous Evils and the Goodness of God, e.g. 64); Davies 
(The Reality of God and the Problem of Evil, especially ch. 4 and the appendix); and Rubio (“God 
Meets Satan’s Apple,” 3002–3003). Davies explicitly rejects the idea that God acts on reasons, 
but he builds more into the notion of God’s acting on a reason than I do (The Reality of God 
and the Problem of Evil, 215–219).
19See Wielenberg (“Intrinsic Value and Love”) for another (alleged) counterexample along 
these lines. Murphy (God’s Own Ethics, 110–116) argues that NRR avoids various objections 
to skeptical theism. Yet one of Rowe’s alleged counterexamples to skeptical theism arguably 
works better against NRR than skeptical theism. According to NRR, God might not even care 
if human life were “nothing more than a series of agonizing moments from birth to death” 
(“Skeptical Theism,” 198, emphasis removed).
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Such counterexamples, as devastating as they may first appear, fail to 
directly challenge Murphy’s attack on the ethical premise in the argument 
from evil. This premise is the claim that God must prevent suffering in 
the absence of countervailing considerations, or alternatively, that God 
has requiring reason to promote our well-being at least to the point that 
we don’t suffer. To the extent that this assumption has been defended at 
all, it has been defended on the further assumption that God shares our 
moral reasons: since we have requiring reason to promote the well-be-
ing of others, then God does too. The problem, as Murphy points out, is 
that the standard accounts of reason possession—including the standard 
Kantian accounts—fail to vindicate the assumption that God shares our 
moral reasons.20 Indeed, if anything, they challenge it. Our intuitions in 
the jelly bean case may very well be driven by our expectation that God 
shares our moral reasons; therefore, they arguably do not directly respond 
to Murphy’s challenge.
Murphy shows us that the key ethical assumption in the argument 
from evil needs defense.21 An adequate defense of this assumption needs 
to either defend an adequate account of moral reasons possession that vin-
dicates the key assumption, or else it needs to be plausible that the defense 
isn’t just piggy-backing on undefended assumptions about the possession 
of moral reasons. The rest of this paper takes the latter approach by obey-
ing this methodological constraint: we cannot assume that the structure 
of God’s (moral or non-moral) reasons is analogous to the structure of 
our (moral or non-moral) reasons. The constraint is methodological, not 
substantive. We aren’t assuming that the structure of divine reasons is not 
analogous. It constrains where we begin, not where we end.
In addition to helping us address Murphy’s challenge, the methodo-
logical constraint also plays a useful heuristic role. It forces us to consider 
other kinds of considerations beyond the familiar appeals to analogy. One 
such consideration is the normative-axiological fit criterion: other things 
being equal, an overall ethical theory is preferable to the extent that its 
normative and axiological theories cohere or fit “tightly” together. I have 
nothing fancy in mind. Indeed, we apply this criterion so naturally and 
intuitively that we rarely need complicated arguments to tell when the fit 
is awkward or tight. The criterion’s guiding idea is that one’s normative 
and axiological theories are mutually constraining: (i) one’s normative 
ethical theory constrains which axiological theories one can endorse, and 
(ii) one’s axiological theory constrains which normative theories one can 
endorse. My arguments for divine satisficing depend most heavily on the 
latter direction, (ii), so I clarify it here.
20Murphy, God’s Own Ethics, ch. 3.
21You may doubt that Ethical Premise needs defense since it is already so plausible that it 
is bound to be more plausible than any challenge to it, no matter how plausible the challenge 
may seem at first glance. Fine. It is still interesting to consider whether Murphy’s challenge 
can be answered on its own terms.
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First, we expect significant qualitative axiological difference to corre-
late with qualitative normative difference. Suppose that an ethicist waxes 
poetic about how special intrinsic dignity is. While things can have mere 
intrinsic value, only persons can have intrinsic dignity, where persons nec-
essarily have the capacity to guide their behavior in light of their con-
ception of rational laws. If this ethicist did not accord persons special 
normative treatment—e.g., that only persons have rights or that only per-
sons can’t be used as mere means—we would worry that she has “taken 
back” her claim that only persons have some special intrinsic dignity. That 
is, her overall (i.e., normative + axiological) theory would be objectionably 
awkward if the “intrinsic dignity” of persons failed to have normative 
significance. (Of course, we may object to such a normative theory on the 
grounds that animals have moral rights or whatever. That’s because one’s 
normative theory also constrains one’s axiology. If the ethicist extends 
rights to animals, we expect her to modify her axiology, e.g., by extend-
ing dignity to animals or by making the standards for personhood more 
inclusive.)
Second, we expect the absence of qualitative axiological difference to 
correlate with the absence of qualitative normative difference. Suppose that 
a moral theorist holds that the only intrinsically valuable thing is pleasure, 
and that the only thing that affects its value is its quantity. Nonetheless, 
he claims that we have reason to promote the pleasure of people but not 
the pleasure of animals, and this is because of the nature of pleasure itself 
(and not because, say, that we’ve made promises to people that we haven’t 
made to animals). This fit between the axiological and normative aspects 
of his view seems objectionably awkward, bordering on incoherent.22
Perhaps we’ll sacrifice some awkwardness in the way our axiology fits 
with our normative theory for the sake of other theoretical virtues; how-
ever, other things being equal, an overall ethical theory is preferable to the 
extent that its normative and axiological positions cohere or fit “tightly” 
together. In §4 and §7, I  Identify and defend the axiology I’m working 
with in this paper. In §5 and §6, I argue that SR* is the normative theory 
that best fits this axiology.
4. Medieval Neo-Platonism
4.1. Medieval Neo-Platonism and Full Goodness
I provisionally assume medieval neo-Platonism, the axiological context in 
which full goodness is most familiar (though not by that name). Murphy’s 
defense of NRR relies on this axiology. I’ll give him the axiology—and the 
methodological constraint—he wants and show that what follows is not 
22The theorist might try to ease the apparent tension by adding some additional mech-
anism, such as conditions (enablers, disablers) or modifiers (intensifiers, attentuators). The 
point is that there is a tension and if it can’t be relieved, the overall (normative plus axiolog-
ical) theory is problematic.
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NRR, but a satisficing structure capable of grounding the ethical premise 
in the argument from evil. I’ll revisit this provisional assumption in §7.
Medieval neo-Platonism has three components.23 First, God is the only 
intrinsically good thing in the sense that it is the only thing that is good 
independently of its relation to anything else. Second, to the extent that 
a created thing is good, it is good by participation in (or resemblance to) 
divine goodness. To claim that creaturely well-being is participated good-
ness is to claim that its goodness consists in a certain kind of relation to 
the Good. Such a claim is compatible with creaturely well-being counting 
as necessarily and non-instrumentally good. Third, badness is privation, 
or deprivation. It is not bad for a rock that it fails to participate in God’s 
goodness through perceiving its surroundings or experiencing pleasure. 
In contrast, if a human life never enjoys such things, it is to that extent a 
bad human life. Badness is absence of due goodness or perfection, absence 
of goodness that a thing ought to have. I assume that a creature’s nature, 
function, telos, kind membership, or something of the sort determines 
what goods it ought to have, though no particular account is built into 
neo-Platonism.24 (The label “medieval neo-Platonism” may be misleading 
insofar as the third component has obvious affinities with neo-Aristote-
lian accounts of what’s good/bad for a creature.)
Note that the privative view is distinct from the Augustinian claim that 
badness is a mere absence of good.25 The language of due and ought is 
essential. The absence of some additional good, even some additional fit-
ting good, is not necessarily bad for the creature. Nor does it suffice for 
the deprivation of the creature. Einstein could have been a little smarter, 
which would have “fit” his human nature, but he wasn’t deprived with 
respect to intelligence. Deprivation for a creature is absence of a good that 
the creature is due or ought to have.
Full goodness is the opposite of deprivation. A creature’s life (in some 
respect) is fully good iff there is some goodness it ought to have and it has 
all the goodness it ought to have (in that respect). A fully good life would 
be “self-sufficient” in Aristotle’s sense, at least insofar as it would be a life 
that is “desirable and lacking in nothing.”26 Such a life has no badness for 
the creature, because it has no deprivation.
Full goodness (in some respect) will rarely, if ever, require maximal 
goodness (in that respect). Human beings ought to have some degree 
23It has been endorsed by Aquinas and Suárez (Newlands, “Leibniz on Privations, 
Limitations, and the Metaphysics of Evil,” 283–285); as well as Murphy (God’s Own Ethics, 
especially ch. 4). Robert Adams’s view (Finite and Infinite Goods, especially ch. 1 and 103–104) 
is a close enough fit for my purposes. As I explain below—see §4.1—his alleged counterex-
amples seem to misunderstand the third component.
24I also assume that God has, at most, limited voluntary control over what goods a crea-
ture ought to have. God can’t make it false that human beings ought to have pleasure or 
friendships any more than God can make it false that 2 + 2 = 4 or that torturing humans for 
fun is morally wrong.
25Newlands, “Leibniz on Privations, Limitations, and the Metaphysics of Evil.”
26Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk I.7.
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of intelligence, but a human being isn’t deprived if she fails to be three 
times smarter than Einstein. Perhaps a human being ought to have at least 
one unit of pleasure each moment. More pleasure is presumably better, 
but a human being is not deprived if she fails to have an infinite amount 
of pleasure each moment. Consequently, some fully good lives are bet-
ter than others. A  fully good life with 10 units of pleasure per moment 
is better, other things being equal, than a fully good life with 1 unit per 
moment.27
According to my version of Satisficing Reasons, SR*, full goodness sets 
the threshold for the good enough. God has requiring reason to make each 
creature’s life (in every respect) fully good, but only merely justifying rea-
sons to make it even better. For example, God has requiring reason to give 
human beings whatever degree of intelligence is required for full good-
ness and only merely justifying reason to give a human being more than 
this degree of intelligence.28
My positive arguments for satisficing depend most heavily on the third 
component, because that’s the component that gives us full goodness. Yet 
the third component is easily misunderstood. Suppose that pain is neces-
sarily bad for humans. It is necessarily bad, on the privative view, because 
having pain is incompatible with full goodness. It does not follow that 
pain is somehow nothing or an absence or that pain qua pain is a priva-
tion.29 Even if pain is just a certain kind of phenomenal character of experi-
ence, its badness for a creature might consist in depriving that creature of 
some other mental state that the creature ought to be in (e.g., a uniformly 
pleasant phenomenal character).30 We must distinguish what pain is in 
27Some non-fully good lives, or lives with some deprivation, are also better than some 
fully good ones. Consider a fully good life. Now consider a second life exactly the same 
except that it contains both a painful pinprick and 1,000 additional units of pleasure. The 
latter seems better despite having some deprivation. This possibility raises a question for my 
satisficing view. I hold that God needs a countervailing consideration to prefer a non-fully 
good life over a fully good one. But what if the non-fully good life is better than the fully 
good one? In that case, the greater quality of the non-fully good life seems to justify God 
in choosing it. God doesn’t need a countervailing consideration to forgo additional good 
beyond full goodness. God does need a countervailing consideration to allow deprivation 
into a life, but the high quality of the creature’s life can itself provide the needed counter-
vailing consideration, at least in cases in which the non-fully good life is better than the fully 
good alternatives. And it goes without saying that my satisficing view (and its rivals, NRR 
and JRR) allow that God might have countervailing considerations grounded in something 
besides well-being that affect his reasons to give a creature a certain amount of well-being 
(fairness of welfare distributions across people, past promises, etc.).
28For simplicity, I  assume that, if a creature ought to have some degree of a good (e.g. 
intelligence), it is always better for the creature to have more of that good. All I really need for 
a satisficing picture is that it is sometimes better to have more of that good beyond what is due.
29Robert Adams’s (Finite and Infinite Goods, 103) and at least some of Adam Swenson’s 
(“Privation Theories of Pain”) objections seem to miss this point.
30Of course, some pains are also good in a way (cf. Anglin and Goetz, “Evil is Privation,” 
5–6). If your finger is touching a burner, it is good that you feel pain and it would be bad if 
you didn’t feel it. Given that something bad is happening to you, it might be good that you suffer 
pain. It doesn’t follow that it is good for you to suffer pain (full stop, without qualification).
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itself from the question of what makes pain bad (for the creature). The 
privative view, as I understand it here, addresses only the latter question.
After I show that Murphy’s neo-Platonism supports SR* rather than his 
NRR, I will drop some of its details (e.g., the claim that all badness is priv-
ative). In the next sub-section, I clarify the features of the third component 
that are most central to my arguments for SR*.
4.2. Medieval Neo-Platonism and the Structure of Axiological Reality
A natural assumption is that axiological reality is structured solely by 
which goods (bads) exist and whether things are better, worse, or equally 
good with respect to those goods (bads). Chang objects that this natural 
assumption fails to capture all true quantitative comparisons between 
comparable goods.31 She introduces a fourth comparative. A  might be 
comparable to B even though A isn’t better than, worse than, or equally 
good as B. For A and B might be on a par.
Like Chang, the proponent of full goodness holds that the natural 
assumption fails to capture all the structure in axiological reality. In con-
trast to Chang, the proponent of full goodness is not adding another com-
parative and is not concerned with enriching the structure of quantitative 
comparisons. The full goodness threshold is qualitative. Every 50 unit 
increase of pleasure might be equally good, but not every failure to acquire 
50 units of pleasure counts as deprivation. Indeed, 10 units of pleasure 
for you is less valuable than 100 units of pleasure for me. Yet if my life is 
already full of pleasure and yours isn’t, then you might be deprived by 
missing out on those 10 units even though I won’t be deprived by missing 
out on those 100 units. Human beings can be better, worse, equally good, 
and perhaps on a par in various respects; however, they also “have to 
have” certain goods in certain amounts. Or, in the more common parlance, 
there are certain goods human beings ought to have or are due.32
“Ought” and “due” have different connotations, but they both pick out 
something like an axiological—rather than a normative—requirement. 
(Actually, they often pick out a pro tanto axiological requirement, but we 
can ignore this refinement until the next section.) Such things are some-
times referred to as “impersonal oughts,” or what something ought to be, 
in contrast to “personal oughts,” or what one ought to do.33 So understood, 
the phrase “goods a creature ought to have (is due)” is not synonymous 
with “goods appropriate to a creature’s kind.” Goods can be appropriate 
31Chang, “The Possibility of Parity.”
32If you aren’t convinced yet that the full goodness threshold is qualitative rather than 
quantitative, we can anticipate the discussion in §7. Simple hedonists claim that there is only 
one bad, pain. The proponent of full goodness objects that there is a distinct kind of bad, not 
reducible to pain, namely the failure to have all the pleasure that one ought to have. Which 
bads exist seems to be a qualitative, not a quantitative, issue.
33Sometimes philosophers use “ought” to refer to ideals rather than requirements. But 
in this paper I am concerned with the requirement sense of “ought,” whether personal or 
impersonal.
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for a creature without being axiologically required, without the creature 
being deprived without them. More intelligence would have fit Einstein, 
but he wasn’t deprived without it.
Some philosophers may reject the existence of impersonal oughts, and 
so may reject the particular way in which full goodness enriches axiolog-
ical reality. In §7, I provide an argument for the full goodness threshold 
that is independent of neo-Platonism. That argument just is an argument 
that there are impersonal oughts associated with the goods a human 
ought to have.
The third component, in my hands anyway, treats this additional axi-
ological structure in a typical functionalist way, using three concepts that 
are defined in terms of each other. Something is deprived when it doesn’t 
have all the goods it ought to have (is due). The goods it ought to have (is 
due) are those goods it is deprived without. Something is fully good iff it 
has all the goods it ought to have (and there are goods it ought to have).34 
So these three concepts are a package deal: nothing can be deprived unless 
it can be fully good and there are some goods it ought to have (is due).35 
To be deprived is to be deprived of something. It is to be deprived of full 
goodness, of all the goods that you ought to have.
These functionalist definitions would leave you in the dark if you didn’t 
already have some independent grip on at least one of the terms. But I’m 
betting you have an independent grip on both deprivation and the goods a 
thing is due or ought to have. You recognize that an absence of sight is dep-
rivation but an absence of omniscience is not. You recognize that sight is 
something that a human being ought to have or is due and that omniscience is 
not. We recognize, in other words, that humans are (pro tanto) axiologically 
34While I argue in this paper that full goodness is the good enough, they are conceptu-
ally distinct. Full goodness is what marks when a creature has all the goodness that it ought 
to have. The good enough is what marks when the requiring reasons to promote the good 
become merely justifying reasons to promote the good. The former is a meta-axiological con-
cept, one that concerns the structure of the good. The latter is a normative concept, linking 
the good to reasons for action. My argument for SR* below is roughly that once you hold 
that the meta-axiological concept (full goodness) applies to creatures, you are committed to 
holding that the normative concept (good enough) applies to the reasons of a divine agent.
35A caveat may be needed if we allow that some badness is non-privative (i.e., if we reject 
the full details of the third component) and also hold on to the full goodness threshold. 
In such a case, perhaps something can be deprived even if it has all the goods it ought to 
have, because it has some bads that it ought not have (is due not to have). Yet here again the 
ought to have is important. Not all bads would be deprivations. The grotesque appearance 
of one’s internal organs is no deprivation of the aesthetic goodness one ought to have, but 
the grotesque appearance of one’s face arguably would be. Just as we need to distinguish 
between those absences of goods which are deprivations and those that aren’t, we must 
distinguish between those bads that are deprivations and those that aren’t. Thus, we’ll need 
to revise our functionalist definitions as follows. Something is deprived iff it doesn’t have 
all the goods it ought to have or it has some bads it ought not have. The goods it ought to 
have are those goods it is deprived without. Those bads it ought not have are those bads it is 
deprived if it has. Something is fully good iff it has all the goods it ought to have and none 
of the bads it ought not have (and there are some goods it ought to have or some bads that 
it ought not have).
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required to have sight but not omniscience.36 (Full goodness has natural 
affinities with Aristotelian eudaimonia. They may be equivalent if both: a 
life that achieves eudaimonia is qualitatively better than a life that falls just 
short and some lives with eudaimonia can be better than others.)
For now, I ask that you assume the full details of medieval neo-Plato-
nism. This will allow us to see that Murphy’s axiology leads to SR* rather 
than his NRR. I’ll then argue that you should endorse the additional axi-
ological structure presupposed by deprivation and full goodness, even if 
you reject medieval neo-Platonism.
5. Medieval Neo-Platonism and Divine Reasons
At a bird’s eye view, my arguments for SR* amount to this: if you endorse 
medieval neo-Platonism (or just the full goodness threshold), then the 
normative-axiological fit criterion supports SR*. We can better understand 
this argumentative strategy by considering some foils.
5.1. The Normative-Axiological Criterion and the Three Rivals
JRR is entailed by maximizing act utilitarianism (among other normative 
theories), but even when folks abandon such views they retain JRR. To the 
extent that there is any direct argument for JRR, it may be little more than 
an application of the normative-axiological fit criterion. It seems that there 
is requiring reason to make a life better than terrible and even better than 
just barely good. If beyond the barely good there’s just varying degrees of even 
better, then there is no qualitative axiological difference between the varying 
degrees of betterness. Since there is an absence of qualitative axiological dif-
ference, there is an absence of qualitative normative difference (§3.2). In other 
words, there is no principled axiological threshold to mark where requiring 
reasons to promote well-being become merely justifying reasons to promote 
well-being. And thus JRR is true: it must be requiring reasons all the way up.
The normative-axiological fit criterion might even make NRR seem attrac-
tive. On the relevant neo-Platonism, all goodness in the world is ultimately 
God’s goodness and badness is ultimately explained in terms of God’s good-
ness. If you have an intuition that God has complete discretion over how his 
goodness is exemplified in a creature’s life when the life is already great, it 
may seem that there is no axiological joint, no qualitative difference between 
the best life and the worst life. The creature just has more or less of God’s 
goodness. And if there is no qualitative axiological difference, NRR must be 
true: it must be merely justifying reasons all the way down.
JRR and NRR treat the normative significance of well-being in a uniform 
manner: it is either requiring reasons all the way up (JRR) or merely justifying 
36It is, of course, a vexed question exactly what distinguishes those goods that are statisti-
cally correlated with human beings and those whose absence counts as deprivation. I don’t 
have a good answer to this question, but there is a distinction here and we do take ourselves 
to be able to tell the difference in at least some cases. We intuitively take the absence of sight, 
to be a deprivation, and not a mere exception to a statistical regularity.
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reasons all the way down (NRR). Whether this normative uniformity is cor-
rect depends on how uniform axiological reality is. If medieval neo-Plato-
nism is true, axiological reality has more structure (so less uniformity) than 
is commonly recognized. There is a qualitative difference between the goods 
that are axiologically required and those that aren’t, between the goodness a 
thing ought to have and the goodness that goes beyond that point (§4.2). (The 
above possible rationale for NRR misses the additional axiological structure 
posited by neo-Platonism.) Recall that it is objectionably awkward to claim 
that only persons have a special axiological status, dignity, and then deny 
that persons are subject to any special normative treatment (§3.2). Likewise, 
it is objectionably awkward to combine neo-Platonism’s qualitative axiolog-
ical difference with JRR or NRR’s normative uniformity.
5.2. A Tale of Two Oughts
My two arguments for SR* are, in effect, just two different attempts to help 
you see for yourself that the normative-axiological fit criterion supports 
SR*, if we are assuming medieval neo-Platonism. These arguments exploit 
two differences between goodness and badness, as they are understood 
by neo-Platonism. The first argument exploits only the third component of 
neo-Platonism. The second argument, which I develop in the next section, 
exploits all three components.
The first difference between goodness and badness concerns a differ-
ence in impersonal ought claims. When a creature’s life is bad (in some 
respect), its life ought to be better (in that respect). When a creature’s life 
is already as good as it ought to be (in some respect), it’s false that the crea-
ture’s life ought to be better (in that respect).
Intuitively, there is a deep connection between impersonal ought to be 
facts and personal ought to do facts.37 The nature of the connection will 
depend on the sort of ought facts at issue. Here we are concerned with 
ought to be facts which involve solely a creature’s well-being (in some 
respect) and specifically with whether a creature’s life is deprived (in that 
respect). This isn’t an all-in, or all things considered, ought to be fact. It is 
a pro tanto one: insofar as the well-being of the creature is concerned, the crea-
ture’s life ought to be better. At most, then, we should expect this sort of 
ought to be fact to ground a pro tanto ought to do fact.38
37Cf. Feldman, Doing the Best We Can, 192. Feldman cannot find any way of linking ought 
to be and ought to do that both is genuine and of “any crucial significance to normative 
ethics” (Doing the Best We Can, 196). I’m going to show that neo-Platonism makes one way 
of linking them significant enough for divine normative ethics that it vindicates the ethical 
premise in the argument from evil.
38I take this pro tanto ought to be to be internal to well-being and independent of whether 
some suffering is deserved or demanded by justice. Just suffering is still deprivation. It may 
be good that a villain suffer the badness of extreme pain, but the extreme pain is still bad, it 
is still a deprivation. The possibility of just deprivation provides a potential way in which 
an ought to be better insofar as the creature’s well-being is concerned might fail to be an all things 
considered ought to be better.
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If an agent (all-in) ought to φ, then both it is rational for the agent 
to φ and it is irrational for the agent to not φ. If an agent pro tanto 
ought to φ, then both it is pro tanto rational for the agent to φ and it 
is pro tanto irrational for the agent to not φ. Recall from §2 that only 
requiring reasons are in the business of making things irrational. Thus, 
both all-in and pro tanto ought to dos are grounded in requiring rea-
sons. Requiring reasons ground pro tanto ought to dos whether or not 
there are countervailing considerations. They ground all-in ought to 
dos in the absence of countervailing considerations. I propose, therefore, 
the following connection between the relevant sort of ought to be fact 
and requiring reasons: if a creatures’s life ought to be better (in some 
respect), then God has a requiring reason to make that creature’s life 
better (in that respect).
Our dialectical context needs to be kept in mind. We are assuming that 
creaturely well-being provides God with reasons to promote well-be-
ing. The debate is about what structure those reasons have. NRR, JRR, 
and SR are rival accounts of this structure. If axiological reality were 
as uniform as it is ordinarily taken to be, then JRR or NRR would fare 
better on the normative-axiological criterion than SR*. For SR* would 
draw qualitative normative distinctions in the absence of qualitative 
axiological distinctions. Yet we are (provisionally) assuming neo-Plato-
nism. We are assuming that axiological reality is divided between the 
goods that a creature ought to have and those it’s false that the creature 
ought to have. Only SR* has a normative structure that matches this 
axiological divide.
The normative uniformity of JRR and NRR leads them to treat different 
cases similarly, and this commits them to awkward conjunctions. These 
awkward conjunctions call out for explanation. JRR holds that, insofar as 
the well-being of the creature is concerned, God ought to make a crea-
ture’s life better even if it’s false that the creature’s life ought to be bet-
ter. But why should concern for a creature pro tanto require God to make 
the creature’s life better, when the creature’s life is already as good as it 
ought to be? NRR says that, insofar as the well-being of the creature is 
concerned, it’s false that God ought to make a creature’s life better even if 
it’s true that the creature’s life ought to be better. But why shouldn’t a crea-
ture’s life pro tanto require God to make the creature’s life better when the 
life isn’t as good as it ought to be? The problem for JRR and NRR is that 
we expect qualitative axiological difference to correlate with qualitative 
normative difference.
In contrast, SR* says that God has requiring reason to make a creature’s 
life better exactly when the creature’s life ought to be better. That’s satisfy-
ing; it doesn’t call out for explanation in the way that JRR and NRR’s awk-
ward conjunctions do. We expect there to be a deep connection between 
the relevant sort of ought to be facts and God’s requiring reasons. Only 
SR* vindicates this expectation. Only SR* has a normative structure that 
matches neo-Platonism’s axiological structure.
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6. Participated Goodness and What a Life is Due
The second difference between goodness and badness, as they are under-
stood by neo-Platonism, concerns their relation to the goodness that’s due. 
Our neo-Platonic metaphysics posits an asymmetry between creaturely 
goodness and badness. Taken together, the three parts of neo-Platonism 
claim that the goodness and badness of a creature’s life are to be under-
stood in relation to God. For a creature’s life to be fully good is for it to 
manifest God’s goodness in every way that’s due to it, for the life to lack 
nothing. For a creature’s life to be bad is for it to not manifest God’s good-
ness in ways that are due to it.
This asymmetry yields two different kinds of choices. If God is choosing 
between a partly bad life and a fully good life, God is choosing between a 
life that is deprived (of manifesting God’s goodness in ways that are due 
to it) and one that isn’t deprived. If God is choosing between a fully good 
life and an even better one, God is choosing how to manifest God’s own 
goodness in the creature’s life beyond what’s due to the creature and when 
the creature’s life is already lacking in nothing. I suggest that SR* best cap-
tures the normative significance of this difference.39
NRR and JRR again have awkward commitments that call out for 
explanation. NRR holds that the prospect of manifesting more goodness 
in the creature’s life never provides a requiring reason to manifest more of 
God’s goodness in the creature’s life. Consequently, even if the creature is 
due to manifest more of God’s goodness, God still has no requiring reason 
to make the creature’s life better. But why is God’s manifestation of God’s 
goodness in a creature’s life totally unconstrained when a creature isn’t 
getting what they are due?
JRR holds that the prospect of manifesting more of God’s goodness 
in a creature’s life always provides a requiring reason to manifest more. 
Consequently, if a creature’s life is already lacking in nothing and already 
manifests God’s goodness in every way that is due to it, JRR holds that 
God still has requiring reason to manifest more of God’s own goodness. 
But once a creature has everything it’s due, once it lacks nothing, why is 
God further constrained in how God manifests God’s own goodness in the 
creature’s life?
Again, the problem with JRR and NRR is that we expect qualitative axi-
ological difference to correlate with qualitative normative difference. SR* 
provides the expected correlation. God has requiring reason to manifest 
more of God’s goodness in a creature’s life exactly when the creature is 
due to manifest more of God’s goodness in the creature’s life. That’s satis-
fying and doesn’t call out for explanation.
NRR and JRR do have one trick up their sleeve. They might try to 
capture the asymmetry between neo-Platonic goodness and badness in 
39Murphy (God’s Own Ethics, 80–81) appeals to the participated nature of creaturely good-
ness in his defense of NRR; however, we’ll see that NRR ignores the difference between these 
two kinds of choices.
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a purely quantitative way. For example, the proponent of JRR might say 
that while the prospect of a better life always has requiring strength, it has 
precipitously less requiring strength when the life is already good, when it 
already lacks nothing. The problem is that SR* gives us an even tighter fit 
between our normative and axiological theories. The difference between 
a creature’s life being due more and it’s lacking nothing is a qualitative differ-
ence (§4.2). The same goes for the difference between its being true that a 
life ought to be better and its being false that it ought to be better. A normative 
ethical theory fits better with neo-Platonism to the extent that it matches 
these qualitative differences at the axiological level with qualitative differ-
ences at the normative one. Only SR* provides such a tight fit.40,41
7. Full Goodness without Neo-Platonism
The Two Oughts Argument (§5) and Due Goodness Argument (§6) are similar. 
They both rely on the third component of medieval neo-Platonism and 
thereby posit an axiological difference: there are certain amounts of goods 
(pleasure, power, intelligence) that a creature ought to have or that are due 
to the creature, and there are amounts of these goods that go beyond what 
the creature ought to have or what it is due. In other words, there is a 
qualitative difference between a life that is fully good and a life that is 
deprived. And they both reveal that only SR* cuts the normative joints 
where the axiological ones are.
Yet the two arguments are not redundant. Between them, they show 
that there are two equally natural ways of speaking (ought vs due) that 
have exactly the same normative implications.42 This strengthens the case 
that there is an underlying reality directing our intuitions rather than that 
40JRR and NRR might imitate SR*’s normative implications with the help of countervailing 
considerations. For example, let NRR+ be the conjunction of NRR with the claim that the crea-
ture has all the good it ought to have counts as a countervailing reason against giving the creature 
more. If that’s the way you want to roll, feel free. Such a view will share SR*’s key implications 
for atheistic arguments: it vindicates the key assumption of the problem of evil and under-
mines any assumption that God would choose the best. But why bother with the extra com-
plication of countervailing considerations when SR* can do the same work without them?
41Do my arguments in §§5–6 work equally well as arguments that human ethics has a 
satisficing structure? Probably not as well. We might expect God to have a unique role in 
ensuring that things are the way they ought to be and unique discretion concerning how to 
manifest God’s own goodness. But if they do work equally well with respect to human eth-
ics, then no problem. The methodological constraint prohibits beginning with the assumption 
that human and divine ethics are analogous; it doesn’t prohibit ending up there.
42The two arguments exploit the different connotations of “ought” and “due.” The Two 
Oughts Argument exploits the natural thought that impersonal and personal oughts have 
some deep connection. The Due Goodness Argument (especially what I will shortly call the 
“increased oddness” of JRR) exploits intuitions one might have about what one person, God, 
owes to another. If you reject medieval neo-Platonism, I suggest that you focus on the Two 
Oughts Argument as it is the one that is most deeply connected to my own thinking and it 
doesn’t rely on the first two parts of neo-Platonism. Even so, the Due Good Argument is 
more directly a response to Murphy’s thinking, and so it plays a useful dialectical role not 
played by my preferred argument.
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we are being bamboozled by our own words. Furthermore, only the Due 
Goodness Argument relies on the first two parts of medieval neo-Pla-
tonism, which allows it to increase the oddness of JRR. Given all three 
components, JRR constrains what God does with God’s own goodness when 
everything else has what it is due and is lacking in nothing.
The third part of neo-Platonism is separable from the first two. Nothing is 
particularly theistic or Platonic about the claim that badness (for a creature) is 
deprivation. A naturalistic Aristotelian approach could accept that badness 
for a creature is deprivation of the goods a creature ought to have. So could 
a non-theistic non-naturalism about ethics, especially one that allows kind 
membership to play important normative roles.43 Thus, there is some reason 
to expect that my arguments for SR* can stand without relying on theistic, 
neo-Platonic approaches to axiology. Of course, even if other metaethical 
frameworks can make room for the full goodness threshold, it doesn’t fol-
low that we should make room for it. If we don’t already endorse medieval 
neo-Platonism, why should we take the full goodness threshold seriously?
To say that full goodness exists for some creature is to say that there are 
some goods that the creature is due or that it ought to have. To see the plau-
sibility of this claim, consider Singleton, a human whose life has one unit 
of pleasure and no units of pain. Intuitively, that’s a very bad human life. 
Indeed, it seems to be a very bad life with respect to pleasure and pain. Without 
appealing to full goodness, it is hard to explain these intuitive judgments.
Simple hedonism claims that intrinsic goodness in a life is just pleasure and 
intrinsic badness is just pain, and that’s all there is to it. This view can explain 
why Singleton’s life is only barely good (it has only one net unit of intrinsic 
value). Yet it denies that the life contains any intrinsic badness; therefore, it 
can’t explain how the life is (intrinsically) bad, nor how it is (intrinsically) 
bad with respect to pleasure and pain.44 A simple objective list theorist may 
point out that the life lacks friendships or whatever. But the lack of friend-
ships cannot explain how a life can be bad with respect to pleasure and pain. The 
full goodness threshold seems to capture our intuitive evaluation of that life: 
it is a bad life precisely because human lives ought to have more pleasure.45
43E.g., FitzPatrick, “The Value of Life and the Dignity of Human Persons.”
44More formally, the inference is as follows:
1. Singleton’s life is bad in itself (bad with respect to Singleton’s pleasure and 
pain) only if it has some intrinsic badness in it. [premise]
2. If simple hedonism is true, then Singleton’s life is bad in itself (bad with respect 
to Singleton’s pleasure and pain) only if it has some pain. [definition of simple 
hedonism]
3. Singleton’s life doesn’t have any pain in it. [stipulation of case]
4. Therefore, if simple hedonism is true, then Singleton’s life isn’t bad in itself (or 
bad with respect to pleasure and pain).
5. But Singleton’s life is bad in itself (bad with respect to pleasure and pain).
6. Therefore, simple hedonism is false.
45The full goodness threshold might also be helpful for cashing out welfare prioritarian-
ism and/or noncomparative harming; however, I’ll have to explore these connections on 
another occasion.
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Full goodness is a meta-axiological notion. It takes no stand on what 
the direct contributors to well-being are. Maybe it is just pleasure/pain, in 
which case hedonism can be salvaged by allowing that there are two ways 
for a life to be bad in itself: having pain and not having all the pleasure it 
ought to have. We could call such a view full goodness hedonism to contrast 
it with simple hedonism. Or maybe the direct contributors are given by 
some sort of objective or hybrid list (as I sometimes suppose for the sake 
of illustrations). The proponent of the full goodness threshold is commit-
ted solely to the claim that some of the goods that contribute to well-be-
ing are goods that the creature ought to have or are due to the creature.46 
Singleton’s life shows us that the full goodness threshold is plausible in its 
own right. As a human being, it seems that there are certain amounts of 
pleasure that we are due or ought to have and that we are deprived when 
our pleasure falls short.
Recall that full goodness falls short of maximal goodness. We might 
be due at least one unit of pleasure each moment, but we aren’t due a 
trillion units each moment. It is this feature of full goodness that grounds 
the above arguments for satisficing whether medieval neo-Platonism is 
true or not. The only downside of taking full goodness out of medieval 
neo-Platonism is that we lose the increased oddness of JRR that comes 
with endorsing the first two parts of neo-Platonism (i.e., that JRR would 
constrain what God does with God’s own goodness even when everything 
else is lacking nothing and has everything it is due).
8. Full Goodness and the Good Enough
One worry about satisficing theories is that there is no adequate way to 
specify what degree of the good is good enough, the threshold that deter-
mines when one’s requiring reasons to promote the good become merely 
justifying reasons to promote the good.47 On the one hand, we want the 
cut-off to be principled. It should track something qualitative. On the 
other, we want the threshold to be “demanding enough”: it must be plau-
sible that God has only merely justifying reasons to make one better off 
than the proposed threshold. It is difficult to satisfy both criteria at once.
Consider a view that lets being good serve as the good enough: God 
has requiring reason to make a life at least barely good and merely jus-
tifying reason to make it even better. The threshold seems principled. At 
first glance, there seems to be a qualitative difference between a life that 
is at least barely good and one that is not.48 Yet the threshold also seems 
46Note that the full goodness threshold is logically weaker than medieval neo-Platonism’s 
third component: only the latter entails that all bads (for a creature) are privative. Also, please 
remember the caveat from n. 35.
47Cf. Rubio, “God Meets Satan’s Apple,” 3001.
48I say “at first glance,” because the difference may not be qualitative if we take the full 
goodness threshold seriously and assume that all bads are deprivations. A life that has almost 
as much pleasure, intelligence, power, friendships, etc. as it is due will be deprived, so bad, 
in each respect. Yet overall the life is still very good. Given a full goodness threshold and the 
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insufficiently demanding. The Repugnant Conclusion seems repugnant 
for this very reason. In the absence of countervailing considerations, God 
must do more than ensure that people’s lives are at least barely worth liv-
ing. Suppose instead that we let flourishing serve as the good enough. This 
cut-off is arguably demanding enough, but it doesn’t seem principled. In 
the abstract, the difference between one’s having a good life and one’s 
having a flourishing life seems to be a difference of mere degree.
Satisficing Reasons* offers an account of the good enough that is both 
principled and sufficiently demanding. It holds that God has requiring rea-
son to ensure that each creature’s life is fully good (in every respect), but 
only merely justifying reason to ensure that the creature’s life is even better 
(in that respect). The full goodness threshold is principled, because there 
is a qualitative difference between a life (or part’s) being deprived and its 
having all the goodness it is due, all the goodness it ought to have (§4.2).
The full goodness threshold will also be plenty demanding. We aren’t 
due omniscience, but maybe most of us are due more intelligence than we 
actually have. We aren’t due infinite amounts of pleasure each moment, 
but maybe we are often due more than we are getting. Imagine a human 
whose whole life and every part lacks nothing: it has every bit of pleas-
ure, intelligence, power, friendships, and accomplishments that it ought to 
have. The worst fully good life is a pretty awesome life.
Proponents of JRR, of course, won’t find any threshold demanding enough, 
short of the best that God can do. Their objection is to (divine) satisficing theory 
as such. This is not the place for a complete defense of satisficing theory. I have 
shown that, as long as divine satisficing theory isn’t ruled out, SR*’s full good-
ness threshold is both principled and demanding enough. This is an accomplish-
ment, as no other candidate for the good enough clearly satisfies both criteria.49
assumption that all bads are deprivations, we don’t go from bad/deprived to barely good; we 
go from bad/deprived to fully good. Within this framework, the barely good (or worth liv-
ing) threshold might be nothing more than some “sufficiently large” drop below full good-
ness. So it may not be a qualitative threshold after all.
49Consider an account of the good enough that we can call the uniformly good account: a life 
is good enough when it is good overall and good at every moment in which it exists. At first 
glance, this account seems to be an alternative to my full goodness account. Will this account 
be demanding enough? Recall Singleton and let’s add that his one unit of pleasure happens in 
the only moment he exists. Given simple hedonism, his life is good overall and good in each 
moment, but his life doesn’t look good enough. So if the alternative account is demanding 
enough, it either depends on an implicit commitment to full goodness or it appeals to some sort 
of list view which holds that a human life has to be “long enough.” If it appeals to the latter, a 
uniformly good life is still compatible with an awful lot of apparent deprivation. While the life 
might be good overall and good in each moment, it could still be a life that lacks as much intel-
ligence, pleasure, friendships, achievement, and so forth as it ought to have. To the extent that 
the life seems deprived, I think we’ll feel some pressure to say that God should make the life 
better and, thus, I worry that this account isn’t demanding enough. (Of course, a life with dep-
rivation is bad and so a deprived life is not going to be uniformly good. But as was explained in 
§4.2, the possibility of deprivation requires the possibility of full goodness, and so any appeal 
to deprivation is implicitly committed to full goodness. To the extent that uniform goodness 
requires the absence of deprivation, it is not an alternative to my full goodness account.)
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Before we return to the problem of evil, let me restate the big picture of 
§§5–8. The full goodness threshold is worth taking seriously whether we 
endorse medieval neo-Platonism or not. This threshold supports satisfic-
ing in two distinct ways. First, it grounds the essential elements of the Two 
Oughts and Due Goodness arguments (but it does not, by itself, ground 
the “increased oddness” of JRR). These arguments show that Satisficing 
Reasons* is the normative theory that provides the tightest fit with the full 
goodness threshold, and so it fares the best on the normative-axiological 
fit criterion. Second, the notion of full goodness provides an account of 
the good enough that is both principled and demanding enough to be 
good enough, thereby resolving a long-standing problem with satisficing 
theory.
9. SR* and the Ethics of the Problem of Evil
Satisficing Reasons* and Just Requiring Reasons have a common core: they 
both vindicate the ethical premise in the argument from evil, namely that 
God necessarily prevents suffering in the absence of sufficiently strong 
countervailing considerations. When a creature suffers, it is not getting 
as much good as it is due (or as much as God can give it) and so God 
has requiring reason to make it better. Thus, God is rationally required 
to prevent suffering—indeed, God is rationally required to make the life 
fully good (or as well off as God can make it)—in the absence of counter-
vailing considerations. Recall that, necessarily, God does what God has 
undefeated requiring reason to do (§2). So SR* and JRR entail the relevant 
premise, namely that God necessarily prevents a creature’s suffering in the 
absence of countervailing considerations.
Pruss and Yancy argue that the third component of neo-Platonism—the 
claim that all badness is privative—would severely weaken the problem 
of evil.50 Their argument assumes that privative evils do not significantly 
detract from one’s well-being. The assumption probably holds for the 
privative evils they focused on. Yet pain and low amounts of pleasure 
can significantly detract from one’s well-being, and the privative view can 
easily explain why (§4 and §7). Pain and low amounts of pleasure drive 
powerful problems of evil even if they are privative. The privative view, 
then, does not weaken the problem of evil. Rather, the privative view—
and more generally, the full goodness threshold—vindicates the ethical 
premise in the problem of evil.
Murphy protests that the key ethical premise conflicts with God’s 
sovereignty:
The idea that the absolutely perfect being could be made to act by some 
creature as final cause is as contrary to that being’s sovereignty as the idea 
that the absolutely perfect being could be made to act by some creature as 
efficient cause.51
50Pruss and Yancy, “Privation in the Problem of Evil.”
51Murphy, God’s Own Ethics, 79.
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Following rather traditional Anselmian metaphysics, Murphy assumes 
that an absolutely perfect being’s (in)action can’t ultimately be explained 
in terms of something external to it. For example, an absolutely perfect 
being can’t be coerced or efficiently caused into action by something bigger 
and stronger than it. If the well-being of creatures plays a role in explain-
ing why God must (not) do certain things, Murphy worries that God’s (in)
action will ultimately be explained in terms of something external to God.
Murphy’s argument endorses a very strong conception of sovereignty, 
one that I’m not sure I endorse. Here I’ll limit my response to showing that 
Murphy’s neo-Platonic metaphysics addresses his own worry. Suppose 
that God has requiring reason to prevent suffering. Presumably, suffering 
contributes to such a reason only insofar as the suffering is bad. Given the 
relevant neo-Platonic metaphysics, creaturely badness is to be ultimately 
explained in relation to God (albeit in a more complicated way than good-
ness is to be explained in relation to God). The reason-giving power of suf-
fering, whatever it happens to be, is ultimately grounded in God’s value. 
For God to be moved by the badness of human suffering is for God to be 
moved by God’s own goodness. In short, sovereignty considerations do 
not support NRR over its competitors, SR and JRR, and so do not chal-
lenge the ethical premise in the argument from evil.52
Conclusion
Once a satisficing structure is clearly distinguished from what I called the 
JRR Conjunction, it seems that no one has previously argued that divine 
ethics has a satisficing structure. Nonetheless, I’ve argued that divine eth-
ics has a particular satisficing structure, SR*: God has requiring reason 
to make a creature’s life and every part of it fully good, but only merely 
justifying reasons to make it even better. I relied on two applications of 
the normative-axiological fit criterion. First, only SR* respects an intui-
tive connection between whether a creature’s life ought to be better and 
whether God ought to make it better. Second, only SR* respects the differ-
ence between a life that lacks manifesting goods in ways that are due to it 
and a life that lacks nothing.
The full goodness threshold emerged as an important contribution 
for both satisficing theory and meta-axiology. For satisficing theory, it 
grounded the arguments for divine satisficing and resolved the long-
standing worry that there is no account of the good enough that is both 
52Furthermore, if this sovereignty objection were correct, it would rule out Murphy’s 
plausible position that God has (decisive) requiring reason not to intend suffering. Murphy 
(God’s Own Ethics, ch. 5, sec 5.6) considers this further worry. His response assumes that 
God’s reason to not intend suffering is grounded solely in God’s holiness, which is wholly 
internal to God’s nature in a way that our suffering isn’t. I contend, however, that any such 
reason would also be grounded in suffering’s being bad. Think of how lame it would be to 
say, “God can’t intend bad things, but that literally has nothing to do with the things’s being 
bad.” If divine sovereignty rules out God’s having requiring reason to promote our well-be-
ing, it also rules out God’s having (decisive) requiring reason to not intend our suffering.
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principled and demanding enough to be good enough. For meta-axiol-
ogy, it explains how a life with only pleasure and no pain can be bad with 
respect to pleasure and pain.
My defense of SR* also meets Murphy’s challenge to the ethical prem-
ise in the argument from evil, the claim that God has requiring reason 
to prevent suffering (or, that God must prevent suffering in the absence 
of countervailing considerations). I showed that SR* vindicates the ethi-
cal premise in the argument from evil. Indeed, SR* vindicates the ethical 
premise even if we grant Murphy’s neo-Platonic metaphysics and avoid 
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